Supreme Court of the State of Washington
Opinion Information Sheet
Docket Number: 69454-1
Title of Case: John A. Godfrey
v.
Hartford Casualty Insurance Company
File Date: 01/25/2001
Oral Argument Date: 10/26/2000
SOURCE OF APPEAL
----------------
Appeal from Superior Court,
King County;
97-2-23918-4
Honorable Michael J. Trickey, Judge.
JUSTICES
--------
Authored by Philip A. Talmadge
Concurring: Charles Z. Smith
Charles W. Johnson
Richard B. Sanders
Bobbe J. Bridge
Dissenting: Barbara A. Madsen
Gerry L. Alexander
Richard P. Guy
Visiting Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD
-----------------
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
Carl Palmer
1107 N.E. 45th St.
Suite 330
Seattle, WA 98105
Counsel for Respondent(s)
Charles C. Huber
Lane Powell Spears Lubersky
1420 5th Ave.
Suite 4100
Seattle, WA 98101
William R. Hickman
Reed McClure
601 Union St Ste 4901
Seattle, WA 98101-3920
Linda B. Clapham
Lane Powell Spears Lubersky
Ste 4100 Pacific 1st Ctr
1420 5th Ave
Seattle, WA 98101
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Wa St Trial Lawyersassn Foundation
Bryan P. Harnetiaux
517 E 17th Ave
Spokane, WA 99203-2210
Gary N. Bloom
Harbaugh & Bloom
P.O. Box 1461
Spokane, WA 99210
Debra L. Stephens
6210 E Lincoln Ln
Spokane, WA 99207-9220
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JOHN A. GODFREY and GERTRUDE M. )
GODFREY, husband and wife, )
)
Petitioners, ) No. 69454-1
)
v. )
) En Banc
HARTFORD CASUALTY INSURANCE )
COMPANY, a foreign corporation, )
)
Respondent. ) Filed January 25, 2001
)
TALMADGE, J.* - John and Gertrude Godfrey obtained a $165,000 arbitration
award against their insurer, Hartford Casualty Insurance Company (Hartford)
from a three-member arbitration panel in an uninsured/underinsured motorist
(UIM) claim. Pursuant to the Hartford policy, the arbitration panel
decision on liability was final, but either party could seek a trial de
novo in court on damages if dissatisfied with the panel's decision. Where
the parties submit all issues of liability and damages to an arbitration
panel, Washington's Arbitration Act (Act), chapter 7.04 RCW, our code of
arbitration, makes the trial de novo provision in Hartford's policy
unenforceable as against public policy. We reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals, restore the judgment of the trial court, and award the
Godfreys their attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RAP 18.1.
ISSUES
1. Is the provision for a trial de novo in the Godfreys' Hartford
insurance policy unenforceable because it violates the public policy
embodied in the Act?
2. If the provision for a trial de novo is unenforceable, would
Hartford be deprived of its right to a trial by jury pursuant to Washington
Constitution article I, section 21?
3. If the Godfreys prevail, are they entitled to attorney fees for
vindicating the arbitrators' decision?
FACTS
John Godfrey was injured on a bus in Seattle when the door closed on
his shoulder as he was attempting to exit. Metro King County Transit is a
self-insurer, so the Godfreys claimed coverage under the UIM provision in
his Hartford liability insurance policy.1 Hartford resisted, and the
Godfreys filed an action in superior court for a declaratory judgment as to
coverage or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration. The Godfreys'
complaint alleged application of the Act. The parties eventually
stipulated to a stay of the superior court proceedings and to arbitration
of the Godfreys' claims.
The arbitration occurred under the auspices of a private arbitration
service, Heavey Arbitration and Mediation Service. The arbitrators were Ed
Heavey, John Patrick Cook, and Murray Kleist. The arbitrators awarded the
Godfreys $165,000.
Following the award, the Godfreys moved to confirm the arbitration
award, RCW 7.04.150, and to reduce the award to judgment. RCW 7.04.190.
Hartford opposed the motion on the ground it was entitled to a trial de
novo pursuant to the arbitration provision of its insurance policy with the
Godfreys, which provided:
Unless both parties agree otherwise, arbitration will take place in the
county in which the insured lives. Local rules of law as to procedure and
evidence will apply. A decision agreed to by two of the arbitrators will
be binding as to:
1. Whether the insured is legally entitled to recover damages; and
2. The amount of damages, unless either party demands the right to a
trial within 60 days of the arbitrators' decision.
If this demand is not made, the amount of damages agreed to by the
arbitrators will be binding.
Clerk's Papers at 178 (emphasis added). Hartford moved to lift the stay of
proceedings in the trial court and to have the matter placed back on the
trial calendar, and the trial court granted Hartford's motion.
Insofar as Hartford invoked a provision of the insurance policy not
previously in dispute, the Godfreys moved to amend their complaint seeking
a declaration that the trial de novo provision was void and unenforceable.
The trial court granted leave to amend.
The Godfreys then moved for summary judgment on their claim the trial
de novo provision was void and unenforceable, and for an order confirming
the award and reducing it to a judgment. They also asked for attorney fees
under Olympic Steamship Co. v. Centennial Insurance Co., 117 Wn.2d 37, 811
P.2d 673 (1991), arguing Hartford's refusal to permit entry of the
arbitration award compelled them to litigate to obtain the full benefit of
their insurance contract. They confined their fee request to the expenses
postdating Hartford's motion for a trial de novo.
The trial court granted Godfrey's motion for summary judgment, and for
attorney fees, citing a Division Three case directly on point. Petersen v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 91 Wn. App. 212, 955 P.2d 852 (1998). The trial
court's order declared the trial de novo provision of Hartford's policy
violative of the Act, and held Hartford had waived its right to a jury
trial by agreeing to arbitrate. The trial court confirmed the arbitration
award of $165,000 and ordered entry of judgment. The trial court also
awarded Godfrey $10,000 in attorney fees. Hartford appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed in a published split decision. Godfrey
v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 99 Wn. App. 216, 993 P.2d 281 (2000). The
majority of the court held the trial de novo provision did not violate any
public policy, stating where the parties to the insurance contract have
agreed in advance to submit to a trial de novo after arbitration should
either party demand it, there is no reason or authority for preventing the
trial from proceeding. The Court of Appeals characterized the arbitration
provision as a form of nonbinding arbitration, holding the arbitration
provision was 'not intended as a final and binding process.' Id. at 221.
Godfrey petitioned for review, which we granted.
ANALYSIS
A. Arbitration
Washington courts have repeatedly expressed judicial approval of the policy
underlying arbitration of disputes. In Thorgaard Plumbing & Heating Co. v.
King County, 71 Wn.2d 126, 131-32, 426 P.2d 828 (1967), for example, we
said: 'The very purpose of arbitration is to avoid the courts insofar as
the resolution of the dispute is concerned. . . . arbitration is a
substitute for, rather than a mere prelude to, litigation.' We have
expressed a public policy favoring arbitration:
Encouraging parties voluntarily to submit their disputes to arbitration is
an increasingly important objective in our ever more litigious society.
This objective would be frustrated if a trial court were permitted to
conduct a trial de novo when it reviews an arbitration award. Arbitration
is attractive because it is a more expeditious and final alternative to
litigation.
Boyd v. Davis, 127 Wn.2d 256, 262, 897 P.2d 1239 (1995). See also numerous
cases cited at Davidson v. Hensen, 135 Wn.2d 112, 117-18, 954 P.2d 1327
(1998).
Indeed, the Legislature and the courts have expressed approval of a
variety of forms of alternate dispute resolution (ADR) ranging from trials
by referees (whose judgments are appealable), chapter 4.48 RCW;
arbitration, chapter 7.04 RCW (where trial de novo is not allowed and but
limited judicial review is authorized); mandatory civil arbitration of
smaller civil cases (where the arbitrator's award may be tried de novo in
superior court); arbitration of parenting plan provisions, RCW 26.09.184(3)
(where the statute allows de novo review of the arbitral decision by the
superior court); to mandatory mediation of medical malpractice claims, RCW
7.70.100, -.130. See generally Philip A. Talmadge, Alternative Dispute
Resolution Comes of Age in Washington, 53 Wash. State Bar News (1999) at
23. Parties are free to agree upon a variety of ADR mechanisms under
Washington law to address their disputes. 2
In this case, the parties agreed by contract to resolve their disputes
over UIM coverage by arbitration. 3 Essentially, Hartford asserts, and the
Court of Appeals agreed, parties in Washington may conduct a private
arbitration, and subsequently, if one of the parties disagrees with the
result, that party may then bring the dispute, in whole or in part, to a
trial court and resolve it there as if there had been no arbitration
previously. The Court of Appeals characterized the private arbitration
here as 'nonbinding.'
Hartford argues we should enforce the UIM arbitration provision in the
insurance contract as written and allow a trial de novo after arbitration
as to all or some of the issues arbitrated if one of the parties does not
like the result. By contrast, the Godfreys contend the trial de novo
provision in Hartford's UIM provision violates the public policy of the
Act.
We have said on numerous occasions arbitration in Washington is exclusively
statutory: 'Contrary to the practice and procedure in the vast majority of
the states, this jurisdiction does not recognize or permit common law
arbitration . . . . In this state, the proceeding is wholly statutory and
the rights of the parties thereto are governed and controlled by statutory
provisions.' Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. Lake Wash. Shipyards, 1
Wn.2d 401, 405, 96 P.2d 257 (1939); Dickie Mfg. Co. v. Sound Constr. &
Eng'g Co., 92 Wash. 316, 318, 321, 159 P. 129 (1916) ('In the face of so
complete an act as ours we are clear, and find this proper occasion to say,
that commonlaw arbitration does not exist in this state and that the plain
purpose of our legislation was to clear much unsettled practice by
codifying arbitration. . . . Commonlaw arbitration has ceased to exist.');
Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. Frye, 142 Wash. 166, 177, 252 P. 546
(1927) ('Construing these statutes, this court has held that there is in
this state no such thing as a commonlaw arbitration; that the proceeding is
wholly statutory; and that the rights of the parties to the proceeding are
governed and controlled by the statute.'), quoted with approval in Boyd v.
Davis, 127 Wn.2d 256, 268, 897 P.2d 1239 (1995).
Washington's Act amounts to a 'code of arbitration' governing the conduct
of arbitration in Washington, unless a more specific statutory enactment on
arbitration applies.4 Davidson v. Hensen, 135 Wn.2d 112, 117, 954 P.2d
1327 (1998); Price v. Farmers Ins. Co., 133 Wn.2d 490, 495, 946 P.2d 388
(1997); N. State Constr. Co. v. Banchero, 63 Wn.2d 245, 249, 386 P.2d 625
(1963).
The parties are free to decide if they want to arbitrate. By their
agreement to arbitrate, the parties may control the issues to be
arbitrated. RCW 7.04.010. As we noted in Price, the reasons for this rule
are as follows:
'(a) that parties are free to decide whether they wish to use arbitration
in lieu of the judicial process, (b) that they may agree on what matters
they wish to submit to an arbitrator, (c) that a party is only required to
arbitrate those matters which are the subject of such an arbitration
agreement, and (d) that the arbitration clause in the uninsured motorist
coverage terms is a clear and unambiguous agreement to submit certain
specified questions--and only disputes involving those questions--to
arbitration.'
Price, 133 Wn.2d at 496 (quoting 2 Alan I. Widiss, Uninsured and
Underinsured Motorist Insurance sec. 24.2, at 265 (2d ed. 1992)).
While the parties are free to decide by contract whether to arbitrate,
and which issues are submitted to arbitration, once an issue is submitted
to arbitration, however, Washington's Act applies. That code of
arbitration does not contemplate nonbinding arbitration.5
Under the Act, there is no such thing as a trial de novo. Review in the
trial court is limited to vacation of the award6 or modification or
correction of the award.7 'Washington courts have given substantial
finality to arbitrator decisions rendered in accordance with the parties'
contract and RCW 7.04. The shorthand description for this policy of
finality is that judicial review of an arbitration award is limited to the
face of the award.' Davidson v. Hensen, 135 Wn.2d 112, 118, 954 P.2d 1327
(1998). The parties to an arbitration contract are not free to craft a
'common law' arbitration alternative to the Act. We have clearly indicated
any efforts to alter the fundamental provisions of the Act by agreement are
inoperative. See, e.g., Barnett v. Hicks, 119 Wn.2d 151, 829 P.2d 1087
(1992) (parties to a chapter 7.04 RCW arbitration could not stipulate to
appellate review of arbitral decision beyond the terms set forth in that
statute); Boyd v. Davis, 127 Wn.2d 256, 262, 897 P.2d 1239 (1995) (trial
court reviewing arbitral award may not conduct a trial de novo); Price v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 133 Wn.2d 490, 946 P.2d 388 (1997) (trial court lacked
jurisdiction in proceeding under RCW 7.04.150 to entertain issue beyond the
scope of the arbitrators' decision).
The rationale for the application of the Act in such an exclusive
fashion is plain. The parties in this case, as in all arbitrations,
affirmatively invoke the jurisdiction of Washington courts to facilitate
and enforce the arbitration. Hartford's policy language invokes state law:
'Local rules of law as to procedure and evidence will apply.' Under the
Act, the arbitration panel may petition a court to compel the attendance of
witnesses, a power the nonjudicial arbitrators obviously do not have. RCW
7.04.110. The arbitrators may petition a court to attach property 'as it
may deem necessary for the preservation of the property or for securing
satisfaction of the award.' RCW 7.04.130. An arbitration proceeding may
result in the application of the ultimate power of the State, the entry of
a judgment upon the award. RCW 7.04.190. Once the judgment is entered on
the judgment rolls, the victorious party may invoke the power of the State
to execute upon that judgment.
To conduct the arbitration that occurred in this case, the parties
sought arbitration on both liability and damages; they brought into play
the jurisdiction and power of the courts as set forth in the Act. By so
doing, they have activated the entire chapter and the policy embodied
therein, not just the parts that are useful to them, such as ability to
reduce the award to an enforceable judgment. Once they decided both
liability and damages would be arbitrated, they were not free to say the
arbitration as to liability was binding, but as to damages, it was not.
Indeed, we choose not to condone what amounts to a waste of judicial
resources. Arbitration is intended to be final; parties agree to waive
their right to have their disputes resolved in the court system. They
cannot submit a dispute to arbitration only to see if it goes well for
their position before invoking the courts' jurisdiction. As we said in
Barnett, 119 Wn.2d at 161, 'Litigants cannot stipulate to jurisdiction nor
can they create their own boundaries of review.' See also Barnett, 119
Wn.2d at 160 (policy of Act would be frustrated by trial de novo of
arbitration awards).8
Because the parties here agreed to arbitrate issues of liability and
damages, we enforce the arbitrator's award rather than invalidate the
arbitration clause in its entirety. The mandate of chapter 7.04 RCW was
unambiguous at the time these parties entered into their contract. The
submission of issues to the arbitrators was irrevocable in the absence of
one of the statutory grounds for revocation in RCW 7.04.010; a party cannot
unilaterally withdraw an issue from arbitration. Thorgaard Plumbing, 71
Wn.2d at 134. The arbitral award was enforceable. See Barnett, 119 Wn.2d
at 153, 163.
B. Right to a Jury Trial
Hartford argues the trial court decision voiding the trial de novo
provision deprived it of a constitutional right to a trial by jury,
supporting its argument by scholarly citations to Thomas Jefferson and a
law review article on the constitutional history of the Seventh Amendment
to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals did not reach this
contention because it decided in Hartford's favor on other grounds.
Hartford has renewed its claim here, however.
Hartford's claim of a right to a jury trial is undercut by the policy it
drafted. The insurance policy Hartford sold to the Godfreys says if either
party cannot agree as to the damages owed under the UIM coverage, or if
there is any liability at all for damages, 'either party may make a written
demand for arbitration. . . . {A}rbitration will take place in the county
in which the insured lives.' By this provision, Hartford contractually
bound itself to arbitrate should the Godfreys demand arbitration. Hartford
asserts its agreement to arbitrate does not constitute a waiver of a jury
trial because it was entitled to a jury trial by the terms of the insurance
contract.
Hartford is wrong. 'The right to a jury trial may be waived.' State
v. Valdobinos, 122 Wn.2d 270, 288, 858 P.2d 199 (1993). While we narrowly
construe waivers of the jury right, Wilson v. Horsley, 137 Wn.2d 500, 511,
974 P.2d 316 (1999), waiver may occur by the failure to timely request a
jury, Ford Motor Co. v. Barrett, 115 Wn.2d 556, 563, 800 P.2d 367 (1990),
or even by the failure of a party to properly participate in an
arbitration, Westberg v. All-Purpose Structures, Inc., 86 Wn. App. 405,
413, 936 P.2d 1175 (1997). But waiver of the right to jury trial 'must be
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.' City of Bellevue v. Acrey, 103 Wn.2d
203, 207, 691 P.2d 957 (1984). By agreeing in the insurance policy it
drafted to arbitrate its dispute with the Godfreys, Hartford voluntarily
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Act, and it waived the right to
a trial by jury. Petersen, 91 Wn. App. at 217 n.2.
C. Attorney Fees
The final issue before us is the Godfreys' request for attorney fees at
trial and on appeal. This is a close question. 'An insured who is
compelled to assume the burden of legal action to obtain the benefit of its
insurance contract is entitled to attorney fees . . . .' Olympic S.S. Co.
v. Centennial Ins. Co., 117 Wn.2d 37, 54, 811 P.2d 673 (1991). This is an
equitable exception to the American Rule on attorney fees. McRory v. N.
Ins. Co., 138 Wn.2d 550, 554, 980 P.2d 736 (1999).
The Godfreys, following Petersen, assert they are entitled to attorney fees
because when Hartford opposed entry of the arbitration award as a judgment,
and claimed the right to a trial de novo, they had to amend their complaint
and litigate those issues. They characterize this postarbitration
litigation as proceedings concerning 'the validity of the policy.'
Godfrey's Suppl. Br. at 13. In awarding attorney fees under Olympic
Steamship, the Court of Appeals in Petersen characterized the identical
proceedings there as concerning 'the right to obtain a benefit, i.e.,
payment on the arbitration award, under her insurance contract.' Petersen,
91 Wn. App. at 218.
Hartford relies on Dayton v. Farmers Insurance Group, 124 Wn.2d 277,
280, 876 P.2d 896 (1994), which disallowed attorney fees in a UIM
arbitration because the dispute there was merely over the value of the
claim. Hartford asserts the present dispute is essentially over the value
of the claim.
We believe this case is more akin to a dispute over the vindication of
policy provisions to which the insured is entitled (for which fees may be
awarded) than a dispute over the amount of coverage (for which fees are not
available). While it is true Hartford does not agree with the arbitral
award of $165,000, the dispute is not whether that amount should be less,
but whether Hartford is entitled to a trial de novo to argue it should be
less. In other words, the dispute is over whether the Godfreys can receive
the benefit of their insurance contract by entry of the arbitral award as a
judgment in their favor. This situation is like that present in McGreevy
v. Oregon Mutual Insurance Co., 128 Wn.2d 26, 904 P.2d 731 (1995) where we
allowed a fee award in a UIM case. The parties there contested the
question of 'stacking' of UIM coverages. The parties in McGreevy were
certainly interested in the amount of damages to be allowed, but the
fundamental issue was one of an insured being compelled to sue to vindicate
a key policy provision, albeit one that affected damages.9 The Godfreys
have had to litigate their right to entry of judgment on the arbitral
award, and are therefore entitled to attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
Arbitration in Washington is entirely a creature of statute under the
purview of the Act. Where the parties submitted all UIM liability and
damages issues to the arbitrators, the provision in the Hartford policy
calling for a trial de novo on damages after the arbitration violates
chapter 7.04 RCW, and is therefore unenforceable. Hartford waived its
right to a jury trial by agreeing in its policy to arbitration. The
Godfreys are entitled to their attorney fees because they had to litigate
to obtain the benefit of their insurance contract.
We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's
judgment in favor of the Godfreys. We award attorney fees on appeal to the
Godfreys. RAP 18.1.
WE CONCUR:
* Justice Philip Talmadge is serving as a justice pro tempore of the
Supreme Court pursuant to Const. art. IV, sec. 2(a) (amend. 38).
1 A self-insurer is not insured for UIM considerations because RCW
48.01.040 defines insurance as 'a contract whereby one undertakes to
indemnify another or pay a specified amount upon determinable
contingencies.' See Kyrkos v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 121 Wn.2d
669, 674, 852 P.2d 1078 (1993).
2 Chapter 48.22 RCW, the statute on UIM coverage, does not mandate
arbitration of UIM disputes. The parties could utilize traditional dispute
resolution in our civil justice system, or other forms of ADR such as
mediation or trial by referee to resolve UIM disputes.
3 Hartford and Godfrey could have agreed to arbitrate specific liability
questions only; they could have agreed to arbitrate liability and leave the
setting of damages to the court system. But Hartford did not seek such
provisions in its agreement with Godfrey.
4 An example of a more specific enactment is chapter 7.06 RCW on mandatory
civil arbitration of small civil claims.
5 There is one exception to the rule. RCW 7.04.010 excludes certain types
of arbitrations:
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any arbitration
agreement between employers and employees or between employers and
associations of employees, and as to any such agreement the parties thereto
may provide for any method and procedure for the settlement of existing or
future disputes and controversies, and such procedure shall be valid,
enforceable and irrevocable save upon such grounds as exist in law or
equity for the revocation of any agreement.
In Department of Social & Health Services v. State Personnel Board, 61 Wn.
App. 778, 812 P.2d 500 (1991), the Court of Appeals had to decide what rule
to apply to review of an arbitration decision when the arbitration occurred
outside the purview of the Act because it involved employers and employees.
The Court held common law principles applied 'to resolve a problem where
the arbitration statute is also inapplicable.' Id. at 784.
6 RCW 7.04.160 provides:
In any of the following cases the court shall after notice and hearing make
an order vacating the award, upon the application of any party to the
arbitration:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators or any of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct, in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior, by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a final and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
(5) If there was no valid submission or arbitration agreement and the
proceeding was instituted without either serving a notice of intention to
arbitrate, as provided in RCW 7.04.060, or without serving a motion to
compel arbitration, as provided in RCW 7.04.040(1).
An award shall not be vacated upon any of the grounds set forth under
subdivisions (1) to (4), inclusive, unless the court is satisfied that
substantial rights of the parties were prejudiced thereby.
Where an award is vacated, the court may, in its discretion, direct a
rehearing either before the same arbitrators or before new arbitrators to
be chosen in the manner provided in the agreement for the selection of the
original arbitrators and any provision limiting the time in which the
arbitrators may make a decision shall be deemed applicable to the new
arbitration and to commence from the date of the court's order.
7 RCW 7.04.170 provides:
In any of the following cases, the court shall, after notice and hearing,
make an order modifying or correcting the award, upon the application of
any party to the arbitration:
(1) Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures, or an
evident mistake in the description of any person, thing or property,
referred to in the award.
(2) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to
them.
(3) Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting
the merits of the controversy. The order must modify and correct the award,
as to effect the intent thereof.
8 To the extent they purport to permit the parties to an arbitration
agreement to fundamentally alter the provisions of chapter 7.04 RCW by
agreement, Van Horne v. Waltrous, 10 Wash. 525, 39 P. 136 (1895) and Keith
Adams & Associates v. Edwards, 3 Wn. App. 623, 477 P.2d 36 (1970) are
disapproved.
9 The concurrence/dissent suggests McGreevy involved a pure coverage
dispute rather than a dispute over the amount of damages. The
concurrence/dissent further asserts this case, at its core, involves a
dispute over the amount of damages. This analysis is far too simplistic.
Like this case, an interpretation of policy provisions was at stake in
McGreevy. If we had ruled the antistacking provision in McGreevy applied,
the amount of damages recoverable there would have been dramatically
smaller. Here, we rule in the Godfreys' favor on the arbitrability of
damages. This dispute pertains more plainly to arbitration, not the amount
of damages.
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