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Case Title: NOVAK HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING, Appellee, v. CARRIER CORPORATION,
Appellant, and YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM and YEOMAN'S DISTRIBUTING,
Defendants.
Date: 02/14/2001
Number: 12 / 99-0238
Decision: On review
from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for
Linn County, Thomas M. Horan, Judge.
Appellant challenges application of res ipsa loquitur principles in
tort action claiming damage by defendants whose handling of goods was
sequential, not shared. DECISION OF COURT OF
APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN
PART.
Webb L. Wassmer of Simmons, Perrine, Albright & Ellwood, P.L.C,
Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
No
appearance for appellee.
Considered en
banc.
NEUMAN,
Justice. We granted further review to
consider defendant Carrier Corporation's claim that the district court and
court of appeals misapplied fundamental tort principles in the resolution of
this small claims dispute. We agree with Carrier's contentions and, therefore,
vacate the decision of the court of appeals and reverse the district court
judgment against Carrier. The facts are
essentially undisputed. Plaintiff, Novak Heating & Air Conditioning,
ordered a roof top heating and air conditioning unit through Carrier's
distributor, Yeoman's Distributing. Yeoman's never saw or handled the unit.
Carrier instead shipped it directly to Novak, surrounding the unit with
shrink-wrap and packing it in wooden pallets, top and bottom. Defendant Yellow
Freight, a common carrier, picked up the packaged unit at Carrier's dock, and
Novak picked up the unit at Yellow Freight's warehouse in Cedar Rapids. At no
time did Yellow Freight inspect or unpack the unit while in its
possession. Novak planned to install the
unit on the roof of its building. During installation, Novak removed the
packaging and discovered that the unit's condensing coil was severely damaged.
Estimated cost of repairs to the unit totaled $3450.75. Novak brought an action in small claims court against
Carrier, Yeoman's and Yellow Freight for the cost of necessary repairs. The
court first determined Yeoman's had no liability based on its contract with
Novak. The contract provided that "[a]ll shipments and deliveries shall be
F.O.B. shipping point." See Iowa Code § 554.2509(1)(a) (1997) (when buyer does not
require seller to deliver goods to specific destination, risk of loss passes
to buyer when goods delivered to common carrier). Thus the court held Yeoman's
was relieved of liability when Carrier delivered the unit to Yellow Freight.
Pertinent to this appeal, the court then
found Carrier and Yellow Freight jointly and severely liable for the damage
sustained by the unit. The court theorized that these defendants shared joint
control of the unit after its manufacture but prior to receipt by Novak. On
Carrier's appeal to the district court, that court affirmed the small claims
court's reasoning. Finding the damages occurred either at Carrier's plant or
on Yellow Freight's truck, the court ruled "[s]imilar to res ipsa loquitur,
the burden shifted to each defendant to show lack of injury on their part."
(Emphasis added.) We granted Carrier's
application for discretionary review and transferred the case to the court of
appeals. There, on a two-to-one vote, the court affirmed the district court's
imposition of joint and several liability. The dissent, noting the case
involved sequential tort suspects, not simultaneous ones, found the res
ipsa doctrine inapplicable. Because Novak failed to furnish proof that the
unit was damaged while in Carrier's possession, the dissent reasoned, no
liability should attach to Carrier. The
case is now before us on Carrier's application for further review. At no point
has Yellow Freight appealed the judgment entered against it. The only question
is whether judgment was properly entered against Carrier. Our review is limited to the correction of errors at law.
Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe
County, 555 N.W.2d 418, 427 (Iowa 1996).
I. Applicable Legal
Principles. It is axiomatic that, in
order to prevail on a claim of negligence, the plaintiff must establish that
the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, the defendant breached that
duty, the breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries, and the plaintiff suffered damages. Walls v. Jacob North Printing Co.,
618 N.W.2d 282, 285 (Iowa 2000). The mere occurrence of an accident, without
more, is not proof of negligence. Brewster
v. United States, 542 N.W.2d 524, 528 (Iowa
1996). The plaintiff carries the burden of "produc[ing] 'evidence from which
reasonable persons may conclude that, upon the whole, it is more likely that
the event was caused by negligence than that it was not.'" Id. (quoting W. Page
Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the
Law of Torts § 39, at 242 (5th ed. 1984)).
Where, as here, no direct evidence of
negligence is available, a plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence. One
rule of circumstantial evidence, res ipsa loquitur, permits an inference of
negligence when (1) the injury is caused by an instrumentality under the
exclusive control of the defendant, and (2) the occurrence is such that in the
ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
Id. at
529. Importantly, the doctrine applies only when control and negligence
coincide. Town of Reasnor v. Pyland Constr.
Co., 229 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Iowa 1975). In
other words, "[f]ailure to connect the defendant with the negligent event
defeats the application of res ipsa loquitur." Brewster, 542 N.W.2d at 528-29.
The difficulty in successfully applying the
res ipsa doctrine in the case of multiple defendants was demonstrated in
Town of Reasnor. There the city sued two construction companies, each involved in
constructing separate parts of a sewer system. One contractor constructed
sewer mains and manholes while the other constructed sewage lagoons, a lift
station, and force main. Town of
Reasnor, 229 N.W.2d at 270. The two parts
of the system were designed to connect but, because of an unexpectedly high
water table at the first manhole, the first contractor had to adjust its
plans, an event causing problems for the second contractor when it "tied-in"
its work. Id. at 271. One manhole eventually sunk, causing the sewer pipe to break.
Id. The
town of Reasnor sued both contractors, alleging both specific acts of
negligence and general negligence based on res ipsa loquitur. The trial court
refused to submit the town's claims of general negligence and the jury
returned a defense verdict on plaintiff's claims of specific negligence.
Id. at
272. On appeal, the town challenged only
the court's failure to submit its claim under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. We affirmed the trial court's decision, finding that "there was
insufficient exclusive control by either defendant for the application of the
doctrine." Id. Addressing the problem of applying res ipsa loquitur to two
defendants, we said:
"Unless there is vicarious liability or
shared control, the logical rule usually is applied, that the
plaintiff does not make out a preponderant case against either of two
defendants by showing merely that he has been injured by the negligence of
one or the other."
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
William L. Prosser, Handbook on the Law of
Torts § 39, at 221 (4th ed. 1971)). Because
the construction companies' control of the instrumentalities at issue was
consecutive rather than shared, neither company could be shown to have had
exclusive control when the negligence occurred, thus making the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur inapplicable. II.
Application of Law to the Facts. The
record before us plainly reveals consecutive rather than shared control of the
air conditioning unit by defendants Carrier and Yellow Freight. Under these
facts, the trial court and court of appeals improperly inferred negligence
based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Moreover, both courts erroneously
applied the burden-shifting rule of Restatement (Second) of Torts section
433B(3). The rule states:
Where the conduct of two or more actors is
tortious, and it is proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by
only one of them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it,
the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused the
harm.
Restatement (Second) of Torts §
433B(3), at 441-42 (1965). In order for this Restatement section to apply, the
plaintiff must first demonstrate that both actors were negligent, even
though the resulting damage may have been caused by only one of them.
See id.
cmt. g, at 446. This principle is demonstrated by the following
illustration:
A and B, independently hunting quail, both
negligently shoot at the same time in the direction of C. C is struck in
the face by a single shot, which could have come from either gun. In C's
action against A and B, each of the defendants has the burden of proving
that the shot did not come from his gun, and if he does not do so is
subject to liability for the harm to C.
Id. illus. 9, at 447. In the case at
hand, Novak did not establish that either Carrier's or Yellow Freight's
conduct was negligent. Factually, the situation is strikingly similar to one
used in the Restatement to illustrate this point:
Over a period of three years A
successively stores his furniture in warehouses owned by B, C, and D. At
the end of that time A finds that his piano has been damaged by a large
dent in one corner. The nature of the dent indicates that it was caused by
careless handling on a single occasion. A has the burden of proving
whether the dent was caused by the negligence of B, C, or D.
Id. illus. 10, at 447. Just as A could not recover for his dented piano,
Novak cannot recover from Carrier as well as Yellow Freight for its dented air
conditioner because Novak has failed to show that the conduct of either
defendant was negligent. Cf.
Walls, 618 N.W.2d at 285-86 (record
permitted inference that one of two defendants may have destabilized ladder
without warning roofer but record insufficient to connect a defendant, acting
alone or in concert with the other, to negligent act). The burden-shifting
rule of Restatement section 433B(3) is simply inapplicable to the facts before
us and should not have been employed to infer negligence by Carrier.
We therefore vacate the decision of the
court of appeals and reverse that portion of the district court judgment
finding Carrier Corporation liable. The judgment against Yellow Freight, not
having been appealed, shall stand. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
